President's message : Pensions in the 21st century by Jeff Lacker
T
his issue of Region Focus
features a look at the
financial difficulties 
facing many public-sector pen-
sion systems in the United States.
Broader-based government-run
benefit programs, such as Social
Security, have well-publicized
funding challenges as well. But
such problems are not limited to
the public sector. More and more
private companies are freezing
their pension plans or asking
workers for concessions as retirement liabilities mount.
Most of these private plans are backed by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), the 1974-created govern-
ment agency that covers about 44 million workers and
retirees participating in more than 30,000 private-sector
defined benefit pension plans. The agency is financed 
largely by insurance premiums paid by companies, but those
premiums might prove insufficient to cover future liabilities.
In fact, a taxpayer bailout is a growing possibility with the 
rising number of firms having to turn their pensions over to
the PBGC. 
In the last five years, according to the PBGC, claims from
employer pension plans totaled $14.3 billion, representing 
70 percent of all the claims incurred since the agency’s 
creation more than 30 years ago. The PBGC’s deficit now
nears $23 billion. Given these problems, it’s worth asking why
firms adopted defined benefit pensions in the first place. This
question is especially interesting given alternatives like defined
contribution 401(k) plans, which carry none of the risk but can
provide many of the same financial benefits to workers.
First, some businesses undoubtedly adopted defined 
benefit pension plans for sound business reasons — or, at
least, what appeared to be sound business reasons. For certain
kinds of industries, workers might accumulate valuable 
information on the job over time. For others, the cost of
recruitment might be especially high. So it’s beneficial to have
long-term employees. In those cases, defined benefit pensions
— which are often based on years of service to a company —
might be seen as useful enticements. 
In fact, it was with this purpose in mind that among the
very first private pensions were those adopted by railroads
around the turn of the 20th century. In the case of railroads,
the objective was, in part, to ease out older workers, many of
whom had aged beyond the point where they were able to 
do their jobs well. As economist Steven Sass, formerly with
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, wrote in a book 
about private pensions, the civilized way to institute a 
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mandatory retirement age was to couple it with a pension.
The railroad pension system helped attract and retain the
right kind of people, and let them go at the right time.
But it’s not clear that this kind of argument makes as much
sense in today’s world. Job mobility is increasingly important
to workers, who tend to spend their careers jumping 
from organization to organization in search of better oppor-
tunities. As a recent Federal Reserve Board study put it: “In
the current environment, certain workers and firms prefer
pension plans that do not penalize job change.”
Also, many companies instituted defined benefit pensions
during periods when those firms had very large shares of their
respective markets. With revenues rolling in, it seemed 
reasonable that they could promise generous benefits — 
and deliver the goods when the time came. But increased
competition has cut into their bottom lines and made once-
reasonable assumptions about benefits now untenable.    
Public policy probably has played a role, as well, in the
development of defined pension plans. When firms have been
hamstrung in their ability to negotiate with employees on
wages, due to government controls, they have often turned to
benefit increases as an alternative. But it hasn’t just been 
during such periods that companies have used more generous
benefits as an attractive bargaining chip. Witness the case of
Trans World Airlines increasing pension benefits in the 1990s
so that employees would take wage concessions — even as the
air carrier was in bankruptcy protection. 
Such decisions, one has to believe, are affected by the 
existence of the PBGC backstop. In weighing whether to
increase benefits or fully fund their plans, firms carry the
assumption that, should they someday go bankrupt, it won’t
matter because the PBGC will be there to protect workers by
providing partial coverage of their pensions. At its core the
PBGC is a form of insurance, the intent of which is to spread
and share risk. Reforms ought to concentrate on reducing
incentives for firms to deliberately shift risks onto the PBGC,
perhaps through careful implementation of funding 
requirements and charging premiums based on credit risk.
Beyond that, as with all forms of insurance where the moral
hazard problem is significant, we should think hard about
whether pension insurance ought to be more limited, or even
withdrawn altogether.